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Abstract
Executives are often paid for short-term changes in shareholder wealth, but
rational shareholders want executives to maximize long-term shareholder wealth.
Incentives for short-term and long-term oriented behavior may depend on an exec-
utive’s level of pay in the distribution, holding other factors constant. This paper
tests for distributional heterogeneity of short-term and long-term incentives in a
12 year cross-country panel of executives. I use the band-pass filter to separate
short-term and long-term shareholder wealth changes (Christiano and Fitzger-
ald, 2003), and estimate of the shareholder wealth-pay relation using method
of moments-quantile regression, developed by Machado and Santos Silva (2019),
which accounts for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity of executive-firm pairs
across the distribution. When using yearly total compensation to measure pay,
executives in the upper tail of the conditional compensation distribution have
longer-term oriented incentives. In contrast, when accumulated executive wealth
is used to measure pay, executives in the upper tail of the wealth distribution have
shorter-term oriented incentives. Since executive wealth encompasses changes to
executive utility after pay is granted through accumulated equity-linked pay, it is
the preferred measure for evaluating equity-linked pay. Results thus suggest that
equity-linked pay should have a longer vesting period for executives in the upper
tail than in the lower tail. I find evidence that executives in the upper-tail are
evaluated relatively to the industry’s short-run and long-run performance.
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1 Introduction
There is an increasingly large empirical literature on executive and CEO compensation
(see Edmans et al. 2017 for a recent survey). Median CEO pay for S&P 500 firms
has increased sixfold since 1980 to US $10.1 million per year in 2014 (Edmans et al.,
2017). Further, there have been volatile changes in pay inequality among executives.1
Given nearly all research on incentives for executives examines the relation between an
increase in firm performance and the executive’s total pay, bonus or total wealth at the
conditional mean. Thus an important and unanswered question is whether incentives
for executives differ across the conditional distribution? This answer whether incentives
of shareholders and executives are aligned differently across the conditional distribution,
not only on aggregate, as the conditional mean analysis shows.
Further, research on wage distributions has largely been the focus of labor economists
assessing factors influencing non-executive wages. While fruitful, it is equally as impor-
tant to research the distributional differences in executive compensation, where there is
a substantial amount of inequality, as well as many firm and government policies which
have an effect on pay distributions. The structure of incentives, and legislation (e.g.
say-on-pay acts in the UK and US) can potentially be used by researchers as exogenous
variation (Ferri and Maber, 2013). This article serves as a starting point to show what
can be done using relatively analogous methodology to existing literature on executive
compensation, albeit in a distributional framework (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Jensen
and Murphy, 1990).
I investigate whether sensitivity of executive pay to short and long-term firm and in-
dustry performance differs across the conditional distribution. I go a step further than
1The distribution of executive pay has significantly changed in past years, and will likely continue to
evolve. Edmans et al. (2017) note that the difference between mean and median CEO compensation
reduced from 67% in 2001 to 19% in 2014 for S&P 500 firms. As a result, thus choosing to represent
“average” executive pay by the mean or the median will affect results. Both can be appropriate:
Mean pay to assess aggregate levels in pay, median (and other quantiles) pay is relevant in assessing
the pay for a typical CEO (Edmans et al., 2017; Murphy, 2013).
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existing literature on this topic by using panel quantile regressions to account for time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity (Machado and Santos Silva, 2019). This method
makes results comparable to other panel estimates of performance pay-elasticities and
relative performance evaluation (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990), identifying performance-
pay sensitivities across the conditional distribution and using all data. I use total
compensation and total wealth as measures for ‘pay’. Total compensation is direct
compensation and grant-date value of newly emitted stock-related pay. Total wealth is
the estimated value of accumulated stock-related pay, options and long-term incentive
plans (LTIP). Most executives have sizable equity stakes in their firm and stock-related
pay, tying their wealth to market value of the firm (Edmans et al., 2017). I use cross-
country panel data to generalize findings to outside the United States, which has been
the focus of most research on executive compensation.
The main results show that no matter which measure of pay is used, incentives to
maximise long-run firm performance are between three and seven times larger than
short-term incentives at the conditional median. I find significant heterogeneity in in-
centives, showing that going ‘beyond the mean’ is important for research on executive
compensation: Total compensation is more sensitive to short-term firm performance
in the left tail of the conditional distribution, and more sensitive to long-term perfor-
mance in the right tail of the conditional distribution. In contrast, total wealth is more
sensitive to short-term firm performance in the right tail of the conditional distribution,
and more sensitive to long-term performance in the left tail of the conditional distri-
bution. A potential explanation for this finding is that wealth contains a much larger
portion of equity-linked components, and is rarely ex-post adjusted after grant-date.
The optimal vesting period for equity-linked compensation should potentially be longer
for executives at the right tail of the conditional wealth distribution than those at the
lower tail. Total compensation has a close to zero sensitivity to short-term industry
performance, holding firm performance constant. I can not entirely rule out that firms
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engage in long-term industry benchmarking of executive compensation, as estimates are
noisy. Coefficients of interest are not conditional on the fixed-effect of the manager in
my approach, and thus interpretations are not conditional on a certain ability or unob-
served factors. This is not necessarily the case for other quantile regression estimators
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. The results can be thought of as similar to a
within-estimator (fixed effects regression) at a certain point in the conditional distribu-
tion. Although I do not claim that the results are causal, I can rule out that they are
driven by time-constant factors such as ability, risk-tolerance, or persistent corporate
governance regulations in a country or firm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related literature, and identifies
hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the data and empirical methodology used to gen-
erate main variables. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical methodology, especially the
application of moments-quantile regression. Chapter 5 presents the main results and
robustness checks, as well as potential starting points for future research. Chapter 6
discusses the interpretation of results and optimal executive compensation in light of
the findings.
2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
This paper links to the literature on optimal contracting and the informativeness prin-
ciple. According to the informativeness principle, in a principal-agent relationship (here
shareholders and executives of a firm), risk-averse agents should ideally be rewarded
positively for effort, net of observable exogenous factors affecting firm performance
(Holmstrom, 1979). In my setting, the proxy for effort is firm’s long-term market value,
and industry average shareholder wealth and macroeconomic indicators are proxies for
exogenous factors affecting firm performance. The long-term stock price captures all
potential outcomes of CEO behavior (e.g., changes in growth or profit, restructur-
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ing) affecting shareholder value and is thus a valid proxy of firm performance (Jensen,
2001; Edmans et al., 2017). Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find evidence that firms do
benchmark against the industry, but more strongly against the entire market than the
industry. Other studies show mixed evidence of the informativeness principle, and
that managers are rewarded positively for external forces affecting firm performance
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).
A natural extension of the ‘pay for luck’ literature tests whether executives gain more
from exogenous forces that positively affect firm performance measures than they lose
if they negatively affect firm performance. This is known as asymmetric pay for luck, or
asymmetric benchmarking in the literature (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006). Garvey and
Milbourn (2006) estimate that for a CEO at the mean, the performance-pay relation
is between 25% and 45% lower when the performance standard or benchmark is down
than when it is up. Addressing a potential mechanism, Bizjak et al. (2008) find that
asymmetric benchmarking serves as a tool to retain CEOs, and does not necessarily
lead to poor corporate governance. In a comprehensive study testing robustness of this
asymmetry, Daniel et al. (2019) find no significant interaction between bad luck and the
pay benchmark in the majority of specifications for US firms, using over 200 regression
specifications.
There are a number of limitations and unanswered questions to the above studies
that require investigation. The first is to take a distributional approach assessing the
strength of incentives for managers. To my knowledge, the only other study using a
distributional framework to investigate differences in the strength of incentives across
the conditional distribution of executives is by Hallock et al. (2010). They find signif-
icant differences in performance pay for conditionally predicted low earning and high
earning CEOs, ranging from 0.0673 at the first decile, to 0.1456 at the 9th decile, using
conditional quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978).
Second, most studies of the performance-pay relation do not differentiate between long
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and short-term firm performance. Firms optimally pay executives to maximize long-
term firm performance (Jensen, 2001; Edmans et al., 2012, 2017). However, if stock
or stock options vest during an executive’s career, it can be rational for her to forgo
positive-NPV projects which reduce short-term performance, engage in negative-NPV
projects that boost short-term performance, pursue earnings management to boost
short-term sales, and engage in accounting manipulation (Edmans et al., 2017). The
optimal contract for a manager over a fixed time horizon, who can also engage in short-
term behavior shifts vesting of a part of equity-related pay to retirement (Marinovic and
Varas, 2019). This softens incentives to engage in short-term oriented behavior. The
deferral of vesting equity is higher in the optimal contract, the stronger incentives are to
engage in manipulation that increase short-term performance. However, lengthening the
vesting period is costly for the executive, as it increases uncertainty through exposing
the executive to risk outside her control (Edmans et al., 2017). Further, executives
may reject risky, value-creating projects if they have a large amount of stock-related
pay (Brisley, 2006). I observe the relation between pay and short-term, as well as long-
term firm performance. I test whether incentives for short-term and long-term oriented
behavior differ across the distribution. This is of relevance to firms, when deciding on
the length of vesting periods of equity, and performance periods of other stock-related
pay such as performance-based equity for executives with different (conditional) wealth
or pay levels. This motivates the distributional framework in my regression analysis.
Third, I also test whether relative performance evaluation differs across the conditional
distribution. In doing this, I differentiate between long and short-term industry perfor-
mance. If compensation is negatively correlated with short-term industry performance,
this can be understood to be because of risk-sharing between firms and CEOs (Gibbons
and Murphy, 1990). Firms can adjust pay upwards in case economic conditions are bad,
as the informativeness principle predicts will be done in an optimal contract. Further,
if shareholders may benchmark the executive performance according to the firm’s value
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relative to the industry’s long-term performance, we may still see long-term relative
performance evaluation. If the firm is in a declining industry, shareholders may still
reward the manager more if the executive is performing well relative to the competitors.
This motivates the investigation of pay sensitivity to long-term industry shareholder
wealth, holding firm performance and other macroeconomic factors constant.
Based on the above arguments, I form hypotheses. I formalize the predictions for the
equation representing the performance-pay relation at a quantile Q. The coefficients
β represent the performance-pay sensitivity. The τ ’th conditional quantile of the pay
distribution is defined as QY (τ |·), and Trendf,(s) represents long-term performance of a
firm f or industry s, and Shockf,(s) represents short-term firm or industry performance.
The performance-pay relation at a given quantile can be written as
QY (τ |X) = β1Shockf + β2Trendf + β3Shocks + β4Trends. (1)
The equation shows a $-$ performance pay relation, as estimated by Jensen and Murphy
(1990), but for a conditional quantile in the pay distribution. Taking the logarithm of
each variable in equation (1), the coefficients are the performance-pay elasticity, or
%-% relation between pay and performance. This elasticity is estimated below. This
specification has a better theoretical foundation when estimating the size of incentives
(Edmans et al., 2017).2 Actions that contribute to firm value taken by the executive
can have an effect that is proportional to firm size. For example, a corporate restructure
will likely increase the %-performance of the firm (Edmans and Gabaix, 2016). On the
other hand, perks, like buying a private jet, may only reduce $-performance (Edmans
et al., 2017). In the following, β′(τ) is the partial derivative of β with respect to τ , i.e.
the predicted change according to the the quantile.
Hypothesis 1. The short-term firm performance-pay relation increases in the quantile:
2In the first specification, I do not take the log of shocks, but this is done in tables 6 and 7 in the
appendix. Thus, the first specifications are for short-term incentives are %-$-sensitivities.
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β1 is increasing in magnitude with τ , i.e. (β
′
1(τ) > 0), where β1 > 0.
Hypothesis 2. The long-term firm performance-pay relation decreases in the quantile:
β2 is decreasing in magnitude with τ , i.e. (β
′
2(τ) < 0), where β2 > 0.
Hypothesis 3. The short-term industry performance-pay relation decreases in the
quantile: β3 is increasing in magnitude with τ , i.e. (β
′
3(τ) < 0), where β3 < 0.
Hypothesis 4. The long-term industry performance-pay relation decreases in the quan-
tile: β4 is increasing in magnitude with τ (β
′
4(τ) < 0), where β4 < 0.
A conditional highly paid executive can potentially have a larger dollar gain from bar-
gaining with the board over the variable pay in case of poor short-term firm perfor-
mance. I expect managers in the upper tail to the conditional distribution to have a
lower performance-pay elasticity if there is poor short-term firm performance. This mo-
tivates the second hypothesis. I{Shockf,s < 0} is the indicator for a negative shock to
firm’s market value. The performance-pay relation at a given quantile with asymmetry
for high and low short-term firm performance can be written as
QY (τ |X) = β1Shockf + β2Trendf + β3Shocks + β4Trends + β5I{Sf < 0} · Sf . (2)
Hypothesis 5. Pay reacts more to positive than negative short-term changes in firm
value: β5 < 0, and β1 > 0. The degree of asymmetry is increasing with τ , i.e. β
′
1(τ) > 0,
and β′5(τ) < 0.
3 Data
I now discuss the data and variables used in the study. I use compensation data from
a 12 year unbalanced panel of executives in the C-suite of publicly listed firms for
40 countries over the years 2002-2013, provided by BoardEx. The data span across
countries mainly consisting of the USA, UK, Western Europe and Scandinavia. The
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unit of observation is the pay of an executive i in a firm f for a given year t. There
are a number of movers in the data, 183, which can be calculated by the difference in
unique executive-firm matches, and the number of executives in the data altogether.3
I include individuals that are executive directors in firms for which there is matching
financial data acquired from the ORBIS database from Bureau van Dijk.
The main dependent variables of the study are total compensation and total wealth. To-
tal compensation consists of salary and cash bonus plus the grant-date value of newly
emitted equity-linked compensation (such as stock options, restricted stock awards),
and long-term incentive plans (restricted bonuses paid out in the future) in each year,
a measure used by Fernandes et al. (2013). The total compensation variable measures
the grant-date opportunity cost to the shareholders of the executive’s pay package (Fer-
nandes et al., 2013). Executives not only receive pay and stock grants each year, but
accumulate stock holdings and non-vested equity-linked pay. Firm performance can
thus affect executive wealth to a larger degree than if one merely used yearly total
compensation (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). The literature on executive compensation
emphasizes that incentives for executives are stronger when using total wealth to mea-
sure pay(Jensen and Murphy, 1990). This justifies the use of total wealth as an outcome
variable used to measure the strength of incentives (Edmans et al., 2017). Total wealth
is calculated as the sum of estimated market value of cumulative holdings of stock(-
related pay), in-the-money options, and long-term incentive plans for the executive
(Fernandes et al., 2013).4
Market value of equity at year end is used to generate the main independent variables of
the study.5 This is used by other studies examining the wealth-performance relationship
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). The long-term stock
350% of executives are observed for 4 years in the data. The probability of an executive remaining in
the sample for the following period is 0.78 on average. However, there is no time pattern in attrition
rate, which indicates that attrition happens, but does not become more severe over time.
4The calculation of total wealth, as done by BoardEx is explained in more detail in appendix A.
5This variable is astk market cap in ORBIS.
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price captures all potential outcomes of CEO behavior (e.g., changes in growth or profit,
corporate restructuring) affecting shareholder value (Jensen, 2001; Edmans et al., 2017).
The business cycle of each firm and each industry is modeled using the band-pass filter
to separate the cyclical component of market values from the long-run trend for each
firm, as done by DeVaro et al. (2017). I also control for the macroeconomic indicators
GDP per capita, GDP-growth in percent, provided by the World Bank and inflation
as the percentage change in average consumer prices, provided by the International
Monetary Fund. These serve to control for time-variant country-level heterogeneity.
Although other studies control for firm size (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006), as larger
firms can employ better qualified and better paid managers (Murphy, 1999); growth
potential using the market-to-book ratio (DeVaro et al., 2017), leverage (DeVaro et al.,
2017), and other variables, I decide explicitly not to include these controls, as they
can likely cause biased estimates of coefficients. Including control variables that are
simultaneously determined with the outcome variable of interest by the independent
variables leads to this bias.6
3.1 Measuring Short-Term and Long-Term Performance
Short-term and long-term firm and industry performance is identified using the band-
pass filter (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003), and is based on the theory of business
cycles (Burns and Mitchell, 1947). This separates the performance, proxied by market
value of a firm f or industry s at time t into a trend component Trend, and a cyclical
6For example, if performance affects the firm’s market-to-book ratio, the relation between firm perfor-
mance on compensation is not identified. The resulting bias can be shown in simultaneous equation
system:
Pay = α+ ρ · Performance+ γ ·GrowthPotential + ei
GrowthPotential = λ0 + λ1 · Performance+ ui
Pay = (α+ γλ0) + (ρ+ λ1)Performance+ (ui + ei).
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component, Shock, so that
Market V alueft = Shockft + Trendft. (3)
This filter is also used to identify the effects of firm shocks on executive compensation
in a different setting done by DeVaro et al. (2017). I apply it to the time series of the
market value of each firm to generate the shocks of year end market value for each firm,
and to the time series of the mean year-end shareholder wealth of the industry.
For the yearly data, I remove stochastic cycles that range from two to eight years, so
pl = 2 and ph = 8. This is in accordance with Burns and Mitchell (1947), who define
business cycles as stochastic cycles in business data between 1.5 and 8 years. Figures
1 and 2 show the application of the filter for the yearly data to a firm and an industry
in the data, and that it works to identify changes in performance with mean zero. The
firm and industry shock and trend variables Shockf,s and Trendf,s serve as the proxies
for short-term and long-term firm performance and industry performance.
Although the shock variable has approximately mean zero and identifies a stochastic
fluctuation, this could still be due to the firm’s own productivity changes over the
business cycle. This could be due to short-term oriented behavior or external factors.
This is why I do not interpret short-term changes in firm performance as luck, but
define it as ‘short-term performance’. The trend component is defined as ‘long-term
performance.’
Table 1 describes the main variables of interest, using all observations from the final
sample. An advantage of the data set is to be able to track executives over a long
time frame. Further in the final sample, I have data from 40 countries, adding to the
generality of the findings to outside the US, which has been the central focus in the
literature hitherto.
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Figure 1: Business cycle of firm with ID GB03194476, showing the time series of market
value, the cyclical and trend components from the band pass filter, removing cycles from
2 to 8 years and accounting for drift.
4 Empirical Framework
4.1 Method of Moments-Quantile Regression
I now discuss the application of the method of moments-quantile regression (MM-QR)
as recently introduced by Machado and Santos Silva (2019). The intuition behind
the methodology is simple: “In a conditional location-scale model, the information
provided by the conditional mean and the conditional scale function is equivalent to the
information provided by regression quantiles in the sense that these functions completely
characterize how the regressors affect the conditional distribution.” (Machado and
Santos Silva, 2019). This makes it computationally easy to estimate a model with a
large number of individual-specific fixed effects. In this study, I estimate over 8,000
individual-specific unobserved effects. In general, the aim is to identify the response of
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Figure 2: Business cycle of the banking sector, showing the time series of average
market value for the sector, the cyclical and trend components from the band pass
filter, removing cycles from 2 to 8 years and accounting for drift.
the compensation Yift of an executive i in a firm f at a certain point in time t, to a
performance measure of firm f or industry s, as defined by Xft, across the conditional
distribution of pay. The response of compensation to performance is allowed to depend
on the position of pay in the conditional distribution, which is modeled by unobserved
noise Uift distributed on the uniform interval [0, 1]. Thus I want to estimate
Yift = X
′
f,stβ(Uift), i = 1, . . . , n. (4)
However, standard quantile regression methods do not deal with the panel nature of the
data. This poses a problem for identification if we want to identify the effect, holding
unobserved individual factors constant. If there are unobserved, time constant factors
αif affecting performance and pay, we have omitted variable bias. Accounting for this
13
Variable N Mean S.D. Min. Max. Skew.
Salary∗ 27,393 506.8 419.1 15.8 2,280.5 1.7
Bonus∗ 23,060 426.7 722.1 0.0 4,232.3 3.0
Equity linked∗ 14,565 2,075.4 4,393.7 2.9 30,025.0 4.4
Total compensation∗ 27,538 1,915.2 3,344.2 17.7 22,458.1 3.9
Total wealth∗ 24,008 15,564.4 52,726.0 4.7 418,808.2 6.1
Market value of equity∗∗ 32,377 6,476.4 15,966.4 3.0 97,129.0 3.9
Firm value shock∗∗∗ 32,377 0.0 2.4 -10.6 12.1 0.6
Firm value trend∗∗∗ 32,377 6.5 15.7 0.0 93.7 3.8
Industry shock∗∗∗ 32,377 0.1 2.3 -7.5 8.9 0.5
Industry trend∗∗∗ 32,377 6.7 6.2 0.5 30.8 1.6
GDP growth 31,814 1.1 2.6 -8.3 15.2 -0.7
GDP per capita 31,565 42,106.9 8,868.6 765.3 115,109.3 0.8
Inflation 31,565 2.5 1.3 -1.7 16.0 1.2
∗∗∗ scaled in Billions $US, ∗∗ scaled in millions $US, ∗ scaled in thousands $US. The sum of salary,
bonus, grant-date value of newly emitted equity-linked and long term incentive plans, equals total
compensation. Observations with zero salary or total compensation are dropped from the data, as
this is entirely implausible. If an executive works in two firms at the same time, plausibility checks
were done and some observations dropped according to the following criteria. If data is entirely
missing, this observation is deleted. If there is a holding company or a subsidiary, and the executive
had the same position at both firms, the observation belonging to the parent company is kept. If
one position was only a representative or deputy position, this observation is deleted. If the firm
is listed in two countries, the headquarter country is kept. If the executive switched positions and
thus worked for two companies in one year, the first year of the new job is deleted, as this generally
covers fewer months. All compensation and market value, shock and trend variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Firm and industry shock and trend variables are generated using
the band-pass filter, removing drift and cycles between 2 and 8 years from the raw data to generate
the trend. GDP growth and GDP per capita are from the World Bank, and Inflation is measured as
the average percentage change in consumer prices in each country, which is from the IMF database.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
would estimate the pay elasticity at the t’th quantile as
QY (τ |X) = αif +X ′ftβq(τ), (5)
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where q(τ) = F−1U (τ). This could be dealt with by including individual intercepts.
However, including a large number of individual specific intercepts in the quantile re-
gression is computationally burdensome. Further, variance estimates of other covariates
may be increasingly large in proportion to the amount of fixed effects (Koenker, 2004).
This is especially the case if we have a short panel, as standard errors for individual
effects will be large.7
A second potential source of unobserved heterogeneity is in the conditional variance
of pay. In case the conditional variance of pay depends on time-constant unobserved
factors, not accounting for these can bias estimates of the conditional variance, if they
are correlated with covariates and our outcome variable of interest. An unobserved
individual specific factor of this description is the risk-tolerance of an executive. Un-
dertaking riskier projects has an option value. This can lead to larger variance in firm
outcomes, as well as a larger variance in employee pay. Further, more risk tolerant
workers may make it to the top of large firms that pay well. The method applied ac-
counts for unobserved differences in the conditional mean and the conditional variance
of pay, using a location-scale model developed by Machado and Santos Silva (2019).
If we make the assumption that the location and scale functions are known, we can
specify our empirical model of the relation between pay and covariates as
Yift = αif +X
′
iftβ + σ(δif +Xiftγ)Uift (6)
where σ is the scale function. I assume the scale function to be linear in covariates.
Here, regressors may only affect the distribution of the response variable through known
location and scale functions (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1982). However, heteroskedas-
ticity may not be linear, but can be multiplicative (Godfrey, 1978; Koenker and Bas-
7To account for a location shift, which is independent of the quantile estimated, Koenker (2004) uses
l1 shrinkage methods to control for the large number of fixed effects. Other methods to only account
for location shifts have been developed by Lamarche (2010) and Canay (2011).
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sett Jr, 1982). In this case the scale-shift for a quantile q is not linear in covariates
but quadratic in covariates, as shown in an example by Koenker (2005).8 Thus, results
should be taken with some caution, as they do not account for second or higher order
changes in performance on pay.9 I estimate
QˆY (τ |Xift) = (αˆif + δˆif qˆ(τ)) +X ′ift(βˆ + γˆqˆ(τ)) + εˆift. (7)
Estimates for coefficient of interest l are
βˆl(τ,X) = βˆl + qˆγˆ. (8)
The scale parameter γ is informative of heterogeneity in the coefficients of interest at a
certain estimated quantile qˆ. The estimation procedure, outlined by Machado and San-
tos Silva (2019), is shortly described here. The average coefficients βˆ in the MM-QR
procedure are obtained by using OLS of time-demeaned independent and dependent
variables, regressing (Yit −
∑
t Yit/T) on (Xit −
∑
tXit/T) . Then, the location shift αˆi is
calculated from OLS esimtation as αˆi =
1
T
∑
t(Yit −X ′itβˆ), which delivers the residuals
Rˆit = Yit− αˆi−X ′itβˆ. The scale parameter, γˆ, showing effect heterogeneity is obtained
by regressing the time-demeaned absolute value of residuals (|Rˆit| − ∑t |Rˆit|/T) on ex-
ogenous variables Z.10 The conditional variance that is time-constant and unobserved
is estimated analogously to above by δˆi =
1
T
∑
t(|Rˆit| −Z ′itγˆ). The quantile q(τ) is then
estimated by
min
q
∑
i
∑
t
ρτ
(
Rˆit −
(
δˆ + Z ′itγˆ
)
q
)
8A model where a single explanatory variable has a quadratic effect on the scale of the conditional
distribution is, for example, yi = β0 + β1xi + (1 + xi)
2ui (Koenker, 2005).
9Browsing the literature, most studies of performance-pay do not include polynomials of performance.
I do not include polynomials to be in line with the literature, and keep results comparable.
10One may use an alternative transformation of residuals that has mean 0 conditional on Z. Here, Z
is X in our setting.
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to obtain esimates of quantiles qˆ in the data, where ρ is the check function (Machado
and Santos Silva, 2019). As the estimation procedure above shows, parameter estimates
for coefficients of interest βˆ and γˆ are unconditional on the executive-firm fixed effect
αˆ(τ) = αˆif + qˆif δˆif . We can make comparative static interpretations independent of
executive ability or risk preferences. This gives a direct link to fixed effects regressions
at the conditional mean: The location parameter identifies the effect at the conditional
mean, so there is no need to estimate standard panel regression with fixed effects
separately. A potential problem is that confidence intervals for scale parameters have
poor coverage when n/T is large (Machado and Santos Silva, 2019). I bias-correct
point estimates from main results in a robustness test in section 5.2, using the split-
panel jackknife method introduced by Dhaene and Jochmans (2015) to mitigate this
problem.11
5 Main Results
5.1 Total Compensation
Testing the hypotheses 1 to 4, I estimate regression quantiles of the logarithm of total
compensation, logYift, of an executive i in a specific firm f at time t, on short-term firm
and industry performance, Shockft and Shockst, the logarithm of long-term firm and
industry performance, logTrendst and logTrendft, macroeconomic controls, and year
indicators.12 The fixed effect is an executive-firm pair effect. If an executive switches
firms, another fixed effect is estimated. This accounts for all unobserved, time-constant
11Machado and Santos Silva (2019) show that the bias-corrected estimator performs far better than
the uncorrected estimator for different panel lengths, and works reasonably well for a panel length
of 10.
12I do not take the logarithm of shocks in the first specification, as these also take negative values. In
tables 6 and 7 in the appendix, I transform shocks in a linear fashion to be positive and take the
logarithm, to estimate an elasticity for each coefficient. Results remain similar, independent of the
measure used.
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heterogeneity between executive-firm matches. I estimate the equation
QˆlogYift(τ |·) = (αˆif + δˆif qˆ(τ)) + (Shockft + Shockst + logTrendft + logTrendst
+ X′ft + ψt)(βˆ + γˆqˆ(τ)) + εˆift (9)
using the unbalanced panel. I deal with missing data and serial correlation of pay
by clustering standard errors via bootstrapping (Parente and Silva, 2016). Even if
there is intra-cluster correlation, estimates of quantile regression are also consistent
under certain conditions (Parente and Silva, 2016). I resample from each firm-executive
cluster, with 50 replications. Location, scale and point estimates of coefficients of
interest at the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles are reported in table 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scale Location Q10 Q30 Q50 Q70 Q90
Shockf -0.0024
∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Log Trendf 0.0160
∗∗ 0.2016∗∗∗ 0.1769∗∗∗ 0.1887∗∗∗ 0.2026∗∗∗ 0.2144∗∗∗ 0.2255∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0147) (0.0202) (0.0168) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0168)
Shocks -0.0005 0.0009 0.0016 0.0013 0.0009 0.0005 0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0022)
Log Trends -0.0169 -0.0229 0.0032 -0.0092 -0.0239 -0.0364 -0.0480
(0.0117) (0.0249) (0.0313) (0.0270) (0.0249) (0.0263) (0.0299)
N 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377
Standard errors clustered at executive-firm level via bootstrap (50 reps) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗
p < .05, ∗ p < .1. Results show method of moments-quantile regressions of log(1+total compensation) on firm,
and industry shocks (scaled in billions for the estimation) and log(1+trend), with executive-firm fixed effects.
Full set of controls: GDP, GDP growth, inflation, and year dummies used. Controls not reported. Data set
used is the full unbalanced panel from BoardEx executive compensation database, ORBIS for market value
variables, and span 2002-2013 and 40 countries. GDP growth and GDP per capita are from the World Bank,
and Inflation is from the IMF database. Observations with zero total compensation or base salary are removed
from data. Compensation and performance variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table 2: MM-QR of log total compensation on firm and industry performance measures
Testing hypothesis 1 in table 2, the coefficient of interest belongs to the variable Shockf .
Both location and scale parameters are estimated precisely in columns one and two. At
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the conditional median, one billion dollar increase in short term firm value is associated
with an increase in pay of 0.83%. Equivalently, a one standard deviation increase firm
shock ($2.4 billion, from summary statistics) leads to a 2% increase in pay. Although
this sensitivity seems rather low, we must note that shock values are not scaled by
firm size, so the pay-performance sensitivity is a %-$ relation. This can, for example,
be interpreted as the disincentive to take perquisites, or the response of pay to an
action that changes dollar firm performance. To identify effect heterogeneity, the scale
parameter belonging to the short-term firm performance is of interest. The significant
negative scale estimate shows that the sensitivity to a dollar change in short-term firm
performance is a decreasing function of the quantile, and responds less for conditionally
high paid executives. Thus, when using total yearly compensation as the measure for
incentives, hypothesis 1 is rejected. Short-term performance pay sensitivity is increasing
with the pay quantile.
To calculate an elasticity for pay and short term performance, I do a linear transfor-
mation of short-term firm performance Shock+x, where x is the smallest number such
that all values are positive. I then take the logarithm, log(1 + (Shockf + x)). The elas-
ticity between short-term firm performance and total compensation is monotonically
decreasing across the conditional distribution, ranging from 0.094 at the 10th percentile
to 0.030 at the 90th percentile (results in appendix table 6). The location parameter
(0.062, p=0.001) and scale parameter (-0.0212, p=0.051) for short-term performance
show significant heterogeneity for short-term performance-pay elasticity across the dis-
tribution. Summing up, the short-term firm performance-total compensation sensitivity
is decreasing in the conditional quantile of total compensation.
Testing hypothesis 2, the coefficient of log Trendf in table 2 is of interest. This is
the elasticity of total compensation to long-term firm performance is 0.20 at the me-
dian. Both location and scale parameters are estimated precisely, and the positive scale
parameter shows that predicted earnings respond more to long-term changes in perfor-
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mance at the top of the conditional distribution. The elasticity is about 27% higher at
the 90th percentile than the 10th percentile. The difference is statistically significant as
the scale function shows. This is evidence rejects hypothesis 2 for total compensation.
Summing up, the long-term firm performance-total compensation relation is increasing
as we go up the distribution.
Testing hypothesis 3, there is no significant effect of industry short-term performance
on total compensation. The estimate of the location parameter is close to zero, and
normal-based 95%-confidence intervals using bootstrapped standard errors estimate
the coefficient is between -0.0028 and 0.0046. Firms do not appear to benchmark
in the short run against the industry. A possibility is that industry shocks mostly
affect compensation by directly affecting firm performance in the short-term, as in
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). The variation captured by the coefficient of short-
term industry performance is residual variance not explained by firm performance. A
stronger test of relative performance evaluation in a distributional framework could
use a two-stage regression approach as done by (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001),
or possibly structural quantile regressions (Machado and Santos Silva, 2019) if a valid
instrument can be identified. Finding a valid instrument has proven to be difficult in
the executive compensation literature (Edmans et al., 2017), although there are some
promising recent advances (Ladika and Sautner, 2019).
Testing hypothesis 4, the coefficient of interest belongs to the the industry trend in ta-
ble 2. The location parameter is imprecisely estimated, and the scale parameter is also
imprecisely estimated. This is in line with the literature, as there is mixed evidence that
firms use industry performance benchmarking (Edmans et al., 2017). I can not entirely
rule out long-term industry benchmarking in line with relative performance evaluation,
as estimates are noisy. Nevertheless, distributional approaches to investigate industry
benchmarking in more detail seems a potential direction for future research. Summing
up my findings from regressions using total compensation, incentives for executives
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are estimated to be more long-term oriented in the upper tail. Conditionally higher
paid executives have relatively longer-term oriented incentives. I next test hypothe-
sis 5, whether short-term firm performance-pay sensitivity is the same for high and
low performance, and increasing in the quantile. This specification allows for different
performance-pay sensitivities for high and low short-term performance, proxied by pos-
itive and negative shocks in the firm’s market value. I estimate this using an analogous
regression to above, with an added interaction I{Sf < 0}ft indicating negative shock
in firm f at year t, and run
QˆlogYift(τ |·) = (αˆif+δˆif qˆ(τ))+(Shockft+I{Sf < 0}ft×Shockft+Shockst+logTrendft
+ logTrendst + X
′
ft + ψt)(βˆ + γˆqˆ(τ)) + εˆift. (10)
Turning to estimation results in table 3, the location parameters for the coefficients
of interest, Shockf and the interaction with the indicator for negative shocks, are not
precisely estimated. This reveals no significant effect at the mean. There is a significant
difference in the conditional variance of pay for negative shocks, but no point estimate
is significant. Thus, we do not have significant evidence for an asymmetry in pay
for positive and negative short term firm performance. A potential confound of not
finding asymmetry in short-term performance-pay relation is executives being fired if
they perform badly. However Campbell and Thompson (2015) find that asymmetry
in performance-pay for good and bad firm performance is likely used as a retention
device, as the asymmetry is stronger when labor market conditions are favorable for
executives. This means the executive’s outside option is higher and the firm must
reward the manager more to retain her. Thus, even if some managers are fired, we
should still expect to observe asymmetry in short-term performance-pay sensitivity.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scale Location Q10 Q30 Q50 Q70 Q90
Shockf 0.0003 0.0057 0.0053 0.0055 0.0057 0.0059
∗ 0.0061∗
(0.0016) (0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0032)
I{Sf < 0} × Sf -0.0058∗ 0.0059 0.0149 0.0106 0.0056 0.0013 -0.0027
(0.0032) (0.0073) (0.0105) (0.0088) (0.0072) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Log Trendf 0.0156
∗∗ 0.2021∗∗∗ 0.1781∗∗∗ 0.1895∗∗∗ 0.2030∗∗∗ 0.2145∗∗∗ 0.2253∗∗∗
(0.0078) (0.0138) (0.0194) (0.0159) (0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0168)
Shocks -0.0005 0.0009 0.0018 0.0014 0.0009 0.0005 0.0002
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0024)
Log Trends -0.0169 -0.0229 0.0032 -0.0092 -0.0239 -0.0364 -0.0481
(0.0123) (0.0243) (0.0320) (0.0269) (0.0242) (0.0255) (0.0293)
N 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377
Standard errors clustered at executive-firm level via bootstrap (50 reps) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗ p < .1. Results show method of moments-quantile regressions of log(1+total compensation) on firm, and
industry shocks (scaled in billions for the estimation) and log(1+trend), with executive-firm fixed effects. Full
set of controls: GDP, GDP growth, inflation, and year dummies used. Controls not reported. Data set used is
the full unbalanced panel from BoardEx executive compensation database, ORBIS for market value variables,
and span 2002-2013 and 40 countries. GDP growth and GDP per capita are from the World Bank, and Inflation
is from the IMF database. Observations with zero total compensation or base salary are removed from data.
Compensation and performance variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. I{Sf < 0} takes value
one if the shock in that year was negative, and zero otherwise.
Table 3: MM-QR of log total compensation on firm and industry performance measures with
asymmetry
5.2 Executive Wealth
One potential source of measurement error introduced by using total compensation as a
measure of pay, is due to the use of long-term incentive plans, and stock-related pay (like
stock options and restricted stock awards) by firms (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Firms
grant executives stock-related pay over a successive number of periods that eventually
vests. The stock related pay holdings react mechanically with the stock price, which is
not the case for salary and cash bonus.
I test whether results are similar when using the logarithm of an executive’s total wealth
as a measure of pay. Results are shown in table 4. Testing hypothesis 1, the coefficient
of interest is Shockf . The location and scale parameters are precisely estimated, and
the scale parameter shows the short-term performance-wealth sensitivity is increasing
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in the distribution. At the median, a one billion dollar increase in short-term perfor-
mance correlates with a 1.43% increase in pay. Equivalently, a one standard deviation
increase in short-term performance ($2.4 billion) correlates with a 3.4% increase in pay,
which is higher than the associated sensitivity calculated using total compensation at
the median. Further, this sensitivity increases to 4.3% at the 90th percentile. These
estimates are for dollar changes in firm value, and are a lower bound, as they mea-
sure incentives for dollar changes in firm value on executive wealth. In table 7 of the
appendix, I measure the associated elasticity of log wealth to short-term performance,
which ranges from 0.05 at the 10th percentile, to 0.11 at the 90th percentile. This is a
statistically and economically significant increase of over 100%. Importantly, this result
is in contrast using total compensation as the measure of pay, and supports hypothesis
1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scale Location Q10 Q30 Q50 Q70 Q90
Shockf 0.0030
∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0022)
Log Trendf -0.0282
∗∗∗ 0.7551∗∗∗ 0.7994∗∗∗ 0.7778∗∗∗ 0.7520∗∗∗ 0.7316∗∗∗ 0.7150∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0338) (0.0389) (0.0356) (0.0336) (0.0341) (0.0357)
Shocks -0.0045
∗∗∗ 0.0036 0.0107∗∗ 0.0072∗∗ 0.0032 -0.0001 -0.0027
(0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Log Trends -0.0202 -0.0365 -0.0048 -0.0203 -0.0387 -0.0533 -0.0652
(0.0173) (0.0453) (0.0564) (0.0494) (0.0451) (0.0454) (0.0481)
N 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377
Standard errors clustered at executive-firm level via bootstrap (50 reps) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗ p < .1. Results show method of moments-quantile regressions of log(1+total wealth) on firm, and industry
shocks (scaled in billions for the estimation) and log(1+trend), with executive-firm fixed effects. Full set of
controls: GDP, GDP growth, inflation, and year dummies used. Controls not reported. Data set used is the
full unbalanced panel from BoardEx executive compensation database, ORBIS for market value variables, and
span 2002-2013 and 40 countries. GDP growth and GDP per capita are from the World Bank, and Inflation
is from the IMF database. Observations with zero total compensation or base salary are removed from data.
Compensation and performance variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table 4: MM-QR of log total wealth on firm and industry performance measures
Testing hypothesis 2 with total wealth as the dependent variable, the coefficient of in-
23
terest belongs to log Trendf , which measures long-term firm performance. The location
and scale parameters are estimated precisely, and show that incentives for long-term
performance are much stronger than for total compensation. A 1% increase in firm
performance is associated with a 0.75% increase in total wealth at the conditional me-
dian, compared to 0.2% when using total compensation as the dependent variable. This
finding is in line with the literature on incentives, which shows that they are generally
larger when using total wealth as the dependent variable (Edmans et al., 2017). This
is largely due to the accumulation of equity-based pay over time, which makes up a
large part of compensation packages (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Edmans et al., 2017).
Further, the incentive strength to maximise long-term shareholder wealth is decreas-
ing in the conditional quantile, as the negative scale parameter for the coefficient of
logTrendft shows. A 1% increase in long-term firm performance is associated with an
0.8% increase in total wealth at the 10th percentile, and reduces to 0.72% at the 90th
percentile.
When retesting predictions 3-5 using total wealth, the results differ slightly. The es-
timates of the location parameter for industry shocks and trends is again noisily esti-
mated, but point estimates show a positive correlation of executive pay and industry
shocks for the lower tail.
5.3 Robustness of Results
In tables 8 and 9 of the appendix, I replicate the results from table 2 and 4 with bias-
corrected point estimates. This is done using the split-panel jackknife bias correction
developed by Dhaene and Jochmans (2015), where the panel is split into even and odd
years. Only executive-firm matches with at least 6 observations are used to estimate
the bias. The results deliver qualitatively similar estimates as above for short-term and
long-term firm performance, but the differences in coefficients across the distribution
are larger in magnitude. This supports the economic significance of the findings.
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Interestingly, I do find evidence for long-term relative performance evaluation of to-
tal compensation against the long-term industry performance in the upper tail of the
distribution, when using the bias-correction in table 8. The point estimate for the long-
term industry trend when using wealth is similar but insignificant. Further, the point
estimate for wealth’s response to short-term industry performance shows that execu-
tives’ pay in the lower tail is positively correlated with term term industry performance
and this becomes negative at the top of the conditional distribution. These results can
potentially be explained by conditionally higher paid managers being rewarded more
for outperforming the industry.
A potential endogeneity concern is that I cannot rule out self-selection into a contract.
In my estimation, the difference in pay across the distribution that is time-constant
and unobserved is accounted for. This likely accounts for a large amount unobserved
differences across the distribution of executive pay and wealth that causes differences
in pay levels. Empirical results, and assignment models of CEOs to firms support
the interpretation that some managers earn more than others because more talented
managers can run larger firms (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Edmans and Gabaix, 2016;
Edmans et al., 2017). I argue that this form of managerial talent is largely time-
constant, and is accounted for by the executive-firm fixed effect. Thus, self-selection via
managerial talent should not entirely drive the differences of pay across the conditional
distribution. This is one major advantage of my econometric approach.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Why do I find total compensation is more long-term oriented in the upper tail of the
distribution, but total wealth reacts more to short-term performance in the upper tail
of the distribution? One potential explanation is that total pay can be easliy adjusted
by the firm to account for short-run and long-run performance in each period, but
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accumulated wealth, mostly consisting of stock-related pay cannot be easily adjusted.
Wealth can only be changed if there are contractual means to restrict the payout to cer-
tain conditions, or regain already granted stock-related pay in certain cases, discussed
below. In the US, claw-back clauses that can recover pay in case of fraud are written
in law, but these can not prevent short-term behavior that is legal, such as investment
choice.13 There are a number of contractual measures used by firms to align execu-
tives’ incentives with the long run shareholder wealth. The lengthening of the vesting
period for restricted stock awards and stock-options, ties executive utility to future
firm performance, even after the executive has left (Edmans et al., 2012, 2017). This
may come at a cost for the firm, as lengthening the vesting period increases the risk
of a good payout in case this extends long into retirement, so an upward adjustment
of the base-pay may be necessary (Edmans et al., 2017). Further, the performance pe-
riod of performance-based-equity can also be lengthened. The use of these mechanisms
in my data go unobserved, so I cannot make a general statement about how efficient
equity-linked pay is across the distribution. The main takeaway is that optimal vesting
periods for equity-linked pay and the performance periods for performance-based equity
dramatically differs for executives across the conditional distribution.
I add to the small literature on the distribution of incentives for executives. Condi-
tionally wealthier executives’ holdings react more to short-term changes, and less to
long-term changes in shareholder wealth compared to conditional low earners, giving
them more myopic incentives. I find no evidence for asymmetry in pay for luck across
the conditional wage distribution. Future literature should disentangle the effects of
different corporate governance policies on performance pay, and how this differs for
lower and higher paid executives.
13The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US enable firms to regain
payments after fraud, even if the executive is not charged. This is implemented by the SEC (Edmans
et al., 2017).
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Appendix 1: Total Wealth
The total wealth variable is calculated by BoardEx. The closing stock price of the
annual report date is used. They implement a Black-Scholes option pricing model.
Volatility is measured using 100 days of historic stock prices. The risk free rate is
measured using the following: UK = 6 months Libor rate, Europe = EURIBOR, US =
10 year T-Bill, otherwise = 6.5% It is assumed that exercise is on expiry date whether
known or assumed.
Appendix 2: The Band-Pass Filter
I now look at the random walk approximation as described by Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2003) used to generate shock and trend variables, the proxies for short and long-term
firm performance. Assuming the ideal band-pass filter generates the data yt when
applied to raw data xt, and the data generated from the approximation yield yˆt, then the
problem of getting the best approximation minimizes the mean squared error between
the ideal filter and the approximation:
E
[
(st − sˆt)2 | y
]
, y ≡ [y1, · · · , yt]. (11)
The ideal filter generates the cyclical component using
st =
∞∑
j=−∞
bjyt−j. (12)
So sˆt is a linear projection of s on y in each t. The aim is to identify a part of yt that
oscillates with a period between pl and ph, where 2 ≤ pl < ph < ∞, using the random
walk filter in the non-stationary asymmetric case (see Christiano and Fitzgerald 2003).
The filter works for non-stationary data in that it is robust up to one unit root, but
it is not invariant to drift as well (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). One must remove
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drift so that the filter induces stationarity. Assuming a random walk plus drift process
transforms the original series using
zt = yt − (t− 1)(yt − y1)
(T − 1) . (13)
Appendix 3: Additional Tables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scale Location Q10 Q30 Q50 Q70 Q90
Shockf 0.0068
∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.0077 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0062)
I{Sf < 0} × Sf -0.0083∗ 0.0016 0.0146 0.0083 0.0007 -0.0053 -0.0102
(0.0046) (0.0088) (0.0126) (0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0089) (0.0099)
Log Trendf -0.0288
∗∗ 0.7552∗∗∗ 0.8005∗∗∗ 0.7784∗∗∗ 0.7520∗∗∗ 0.7312∗∗∗ 0.7142∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0296) (0.0347) (0.0309) (0.0296) (0.0312) (0.0339)
Shocks -0.0046
∗∗∗ 0.0037 0.0109∗∗ 0.0073∗ 0.0031 -0.0002 -0.0029
(0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0025)
Log Trends -0.0205 -0.0364 -0.0042 -0.0199 -0.0387 -0.0535 -0.0656
(0.0174) (0.0487) (0.0621) (0.0543) (0.0482) (0.0468) (0.0482)
N 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377
Results show method of moments-quantile regressions of log(1+total wealth) on firm, and industry shocks (scaled
in billions for the estimation) and log(1+trend), with executive-firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at
executive-firm level via bootstrap (50 reps) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. Full set of controls:
GDP, GDP growth, inflation, and year dummies used. Controls not reported. Data used is the full unbalanced
panel from BoardEx executive compensation database, ORBIS for market value variables, and span 2002-2013
and 40 countries. GDP growth and GDP per capita are from the World Bank, and Inflation is from the IMF
database. Observations with zero total compensation or base salary are removed from data. Compensation and
performance variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. I{Sf < 0} takes value one if the shock in
that year was negative, and zero otherwise.
Table 5: MM-QR of log total wealth on firm and industry performance measures with asymmetry
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scale Location Q10 Q30 Q50 Q70 Q90
Log Shockf -0.0212
∗∗∗ 0.0618∗∗∗ 0.0945∗∗∗ 0.0789∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0449∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0125) (0.0217) (0.0168) (0.0123) (0.0104) (0.0114)
Log Trendf 0.0162
∗ 0.2020∗∗∗ 0.1770∗∗∗ 0.1890∗∗∗ 0.2029∗∗∗ 0.2149∗∗∗ 0.2261∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0184) (0.0252) (0.0209) (0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0215)
Log Shocks -0.0087 0.0091 0.0226 0.0161 0.0086 0.0021 -0.0039
(0.0069) (0.0156) (0.0209) (0.0178) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0166)
Log Trends -0.0193 -0.0208 0.0090 -0.0052 -0.0218 -0.0361 -0.0494
(0.0117) (0.0271) (0.0338) (0.0294) (0.0271) (0.0280) (0.0311)
N 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377
Results show method of moments-quantile regressions of log(1+total compensation) on firm, and industry
shocks ((log(1 + (Shockf + x)), where x is the smallest number such that all values are non-negative) and
log(1+trend)) and log(1+trend), with executive-firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at executive-firm
level via bootstrap (50 reps) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. Full set of controls: GDP,
GDP growth, inflation, and year dummies used. Controls not reported. Data set used is the full unbalanced
panel from BoardEx executive compensation database, ORBIS for market value variables, and span 2002-2013
and 40 countries. GDP growth and GDP per capita are from the World Bank, and Inflation is from the IMF
database. Observations with zero total compensation or base salary are removed from data. Compensation
and performance variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table 6: MM-QR of log total compensation on firm and industry performance measures: Trans-
formed shocks
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scale Location Q10 Q30 Q50 Q70 Q90
Log Shockf 0.0210
∗∗ 0.0844∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗ 0.0866∗∗∗ 0.1019∗∗∗ 0.1142∗∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0165) (0.0223) (0.0184) (0.0165) (0.0176) (0.0201)
Log Trendf -0.0281
∗∗ 0.7550∗∗∗ 0.7992∗∗∗ 0.7777∗∗∗ 0.7520∗∗∗ 0.7315∗∗∗ 0.7150∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0371) (0.0443) (0.0398) (0.0369) (0.0368) (0.0384)
Log Shocks -0.0230
∗∗ 0.0379∗∗ 0.0739∗∗ 0.0564∗∗ 0.0354∗∗ 0.0187 0.0053
(0.0101) (0.0184) (0.0297) (0.0235) (0.0179) (0.0161) (0.0170)
Log Trends -0.0203 -0.0265 0.0053 -0.0102 -0.0287 -0.0435 -0.0554
(0.0168) (0.0526) (0.0645) (0.0575) (0.0522) (0.0510) (0.0521)
N 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377
Standard errors clustered at executive-firm level via bootstrap (50 reps) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗
p < .05, ∗ p < .1. Results show method of moments-quantile regressions of log(1+total wealth) on firm,
and industry shocks ((log(1 + (Shockf + x)), where x is the smallest number such that all values are non-
negative) and log(1+trend)) and log(1+trend), with executive-firm fixed effects. Full set of controls: GDP,
GDP growth, inflation, and year dummies used. Controls not reported. Data set used is the full unbalanced
panel from BoardEx executive compensation database, ORBIS for market value variables, and span 2002-2013
and 40 countries. GDP growth and GDP per capita are from the World Bank, and Inflation is from the IMF
database. Observations with zero total compensation or base salary are removed from data, and compensation
and market value of equity, as well as shocks are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table 7: MM-QR of log total wealth on firm and industry performance measures: log of
transformed shocks
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Q10 Q30 Q50 Q70 Q90
Shockf 0.0172
∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Log Trendf 0.1397
∗∗∗ 0.1698∗∗∗ 0.2045∗∗∗ 0.2331∗∗∗ 0.2610∗∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0179) (0.0143) (0.0169) (0.0169)
Shocks 0.0030 0.0020 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0011
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0029)
Log Trends 0.0228 0.0006 -0.0250 -0.0461
∗ -0.0667∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0252) (0.0232) (0.0263) (0.0289)
N 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377
This table shows bias-corrected estimates of coefficients estimated in table 2. This is
done using the split-panel jackknife bias correction by Dhaene and Jochmans (2015),
where the panel is split into even and odd years, and only executive-firm matches
with at least 6 observations are used to estimate the bias. Standard errors clustered
at executive-firm level via bootstrap (50 reps) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗ p < .1. Results show method of moments-quantile regressions of log(1+total
compensation) on firm, and industry shocks (scaled in billions for the estimation)
and log(1+trend), with executive-firm fixed effects. Full set of controls: GDP, GDP
growth, inflation, and year dummies used. Controls not reported. Data set used is
the full unbalanced panel from BoardEx executive compensation database, ORBIS
for market value variables, and span 2002-2013 and 40 countries. GDP growth and
GDP per capita are from the World Bank, and Inflation is from the IMF database.
Observations with zero total compensation or base salary are removed from data,
and compensation and market value of equity, as well as shocks are winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table 8: Bias-corrected estimates of total compensation-performance
sensitivities.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Q10 Q30 Q50 Q70 Q90
Shockf 0.0046 0.0093
∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Log Trendf 0.8742
∗∗∗ 0.8143∗∗∗ 0.7469∗∗∗ 0.6921∗∗∗ 0.6478∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0334) (0.0319) (0.0393) (0.0387)
Shocks 0.0183
∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0026 -0.0041 -0.0096∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0029)
Log Trends -0.0047 -0.0207 -0.0386 -0.0533 -0.0651
(0.0524) (0.0457) (0.0472) (0.0542) (0.0509)
N 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377 32,377
This table shows bias-corrected estimates of coefficients estimated in table 4. This is
done using the split-panel jackknife bias correction by Dhaene and Jochmans (2015),
where the panel is split into even and odd years, and only executive-firm matches
with at least 6 observations are used to estimate the bias. Results show method
of moments-quantile regressions of log(1+total compensation) on firm, and industry
shocks (scaled in billions for the estimation) and log(1+trend), with executive-firm
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at executive-firm level via bootstrap (50 reps)
in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. Full set of controls: GDP, GDP
growth, inflation, and year dummies used. Controls not reported. Data set used is
the full unbalanced panel from BoardEx executive compensation database, ORBIS
for market value variables, and span 2002-2013 and 40 countries. GDP growth and
GDP per capita are from the World Bank, and Inflation is from the IMF database.
Observations with zero total compensation or base salary are removed from data,
and compensation and market value of equity, as well as shocks are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles.
Table 9: Bias-corrected estimates of total wealth-performance sensitivi-
ties.
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